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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

K.L.C. INCORPORATED,

Plaintiff-Respondent
and Counter Defendant

vs.
RON McLEAN

Defendant-Appellant
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vs.
KEARN'S LIQUIDATION CENTER,
INO., a corporation, and JOHN PARAS,
Counter Defendants-Respondents
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPEAL No. 18103

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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Hon. G. Hal Taylor, Judge
Robert R. Mallinckrodt
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 328-1624
Attorneys for Defendent-Appellant
Earl S. Spafford
Spafford, Dibb, Duffin & Jensen
311 South State, Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Counter DefendantsRespondents
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APPEAL No. 18103

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Defendant-Appellant files this Reply Brief to point out what he believes is
a serious misstatement of fact regarding a recent case cited by respondents in their
Brief.
On page six of Respondent's Brief, respondents state that the facts in the
Utah case of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 76·5 (Utah 1980) show that:

"Plaintiff began

discovery procedures, but nine months later defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for
failure to diligently prosecute, ... ".

Respondents contend that that case is similar to

the present case where discovery proceedings had been diligently pursued for an
extended period before the motion to dismiss was made. The actual facts in lVilson v.
Lambert are stated on page 767 of the opinion as follows:
On January 10, 1978, seven months later [after
substitution of a new party plaintiff], and more
than nine years after the original petition to review
had been filed, the trial court sua sponte, issued an
Order to the parties to appear and show cause why
the action should not be dismissed because of failure
to prosecute.
Upon hearing argument on the
matter, the Order to Show Cause was stricken and
-erred to the trial calendar.
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Nine months later, on October 3, 1978,
defendant was served with Plaintiff's First
Interrogatories. Two Weeks thereafter, on October
16, 1978, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for
failure diligently to prosecute. (emphasis added).
And further, at page 768:
Plaintiffs' predecessor in interest personally
delayed the consideration of the denied applications
by the lower court from 1968 until the time of his
death in 1975. Thereafter, plaintiffs, even following
the approval of their purchase from Baldwin's estate
by the probate court, delayed sixteen months before
even inaugurating discovery in the matter.
No
explanation justifying such delay is offered in the
arguments or in the record.
The trial court's
issuance of a Show Cause Order put them on ample
notice that their clairrl was in jeopardy, yet they
delayed going forward for the better part of a year.
It is thus clear that in Wilson v. Lambert no discovery other than the mere
serving of interrogatories had been pursued prior to the dismissal.

The :Vlotion to

Dismiss for failure to prosecute was filed just two weeks after interrogatories had
been served, the interrogatories being the first action by any party after the period of
inactivity.

No answers had been filed or other actions taken by defendant prior to

filing his motion. Thus, the Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute was timely filed
before either party had spent extensive time and effort in prosecuting the action or
preparing

for

trial.

In

the

present

case,

the

action

had

been

actively

prosecuted by both parties for over one and one-half years before the Motion to
Dismiss was made. A deposition of one of the respondents had been taken and he had
submitted answers to interrogatories. It is submitted that the Wilson case is clearly
not similar to the p·resent one.
Brasher Motor and Finance Company v. Brown, 461 P.2d 464 (Utah 1969) is
also distinguishable from the present facts.

In Brasher, the issue was whether the

court had authority to dismiss the action sua sponte under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

In that case, it was held that the court had such authority when

neither party had prosecuted the action for o\ ~" ,__,~··- .. -=---9-·-__,-~, _,,~
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"""'at the

result would have been if both parties, prior to the sua sponte dismissal, had
reactivated the litigation after a long period of inactivity was not addressed by the
court.
Johnson v. Firebrand, 571 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1977) is applicable to the
present case. In Johnson, the court reversed a dismissal for lack of prosecution where
both parties had been unexplainably inactive for nearly four years and where either
party could have brought the action to a conclusion during that period. The fact that
one party hired new counsel to reactivate the litigation supported the contention that
the trial court abused its discretion.

In the present case, all parties had been

unexplainably inactive for a long period of time prior to appellant obtaining a new
attorney and diligently prosecuting the case and, during that period of inactivity, any
of the parties could have brought the action to a conclusion. Furthermore, all parties
in the present case had reactivated the litigation over one and one-half years before

the Motion to Dismiss was made.
In Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen Contractors,

Inc., 544 P .2d 876 (Utah 1975), the case relied upon by respondents as the "key" case in
this Court's line of cases dealing with dismissals for lack of prosecution, and a case
where the lower court's dismissal was reversed, the Court stated at pages 878-879:
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the

business of the court with efficiency and expedition
the trial court should have a reasonable latitude of
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a
party fails to move for ward according to the rules
and the directions of the court, without justifiable
excuse.
But that prerogative falls short of
unreasonable and arbitrary action which will result
in injustice.
Whether there is such justifiable
excuse is to be determined by considering more
factors than merely the length of time since the suit
was filed. Some cons id era tion should be 0o-iven to
the conduct of both parties, and to the opportunity
each has had to move the case forward and what
they have done about it; and also what difficulty or
prejudice may have been caused to the other side;
and most important, whether injustice may result
-"--.- ~ ~L·::: ·~i_:::.:.:.~__:::sal.
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Here, none of the parties took any action to advance the litigation to a
conclusion until appellant began diseovery proceedings and had the case set for trial.
Although the long delay between filing the complaint and a trial in this matter may
cause some hardship to the parties, both parties are affected equally.

Defendant-

Appellant submits that, most importantly, an injustice is done if he is denied his day in
court.
As stated by this Court in the Westinghouse case:
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with
dispatch and to move calendars with expedition in
order to keep them up to date. But it is even more
important to keep in mind that the very reason for
the existence of courts is to afford disputants an
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between
them.
Respectfully,
MALLINCKRODT & MALLINCKRODT

~ ,,,,.--

tZJ-J--1<.
Robert R. :\1allinckrodt

CERTIFICATE OF SER VICE

The foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief was served on plaintiff-respondent
and counter defendants-respondents by mailing two copies thereof, first class mail,
postage prepaid, to Earl S. Spafford, Esq., Spafford, Dibb, Duffin & Jensen, 311 South
Sta te, Suite 380, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, their attorneys, this
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